The Turns to the Left in Argentina and Uruguay: Presidential Campaigns since 2003 by González, Luis E. & Amadeo, Belén
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 6 51
The Turns To The LefT in ArgenTinA  
And uruguAy: PresidenTiAL CAmPAigns  
sinCe 2003
Luis E. González1 – Belén Amadeo2
Abstract
From the beginning of this century Argentina and Uruguay, as 
many Latin American countries, underwent a turn to the left. 
These turns to the left may be called “the Kirchner cycle” (or “K 
cycle”) in Argentina, after presidents Néstor Kirchner and his wife, 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and the “Frente Amplio cycle” (FA, 
Broad Front) in Uruguay, for its leading political party. Argentina’s 
turn to the left ended in the presidential election of 2015 in which 
the Kirchnerist candidate was defeated; Uruguay’s FA cycle will 
run at least until the 2019 presidential election.
Since Argentina and Uruguay’s turns are part of a simultaneous re-
gional turn to the left, their respective national leaderships were 
not the absolute creators of each country’s “turn”. What they did 
was to give national shape to strong regional waves. These pro-
cesses were conditioned by national circumstances, which in 
some respects were clearly different in each of them. Despite deep 
social similarities, Argentina and Uruguay have different political 
cultures and histories that shape their electoral campaigns. Thus, 
this paper probes into the similarities and differences between 
the two “turns” to the left focusing on their victorious presidential 
campaigns (2003, 2007 and 2011 in Argentina, and 2004, 2009 
and 2014 in Uruguay).  
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This analysis leads to (i) an assessment of the relative impor-
tance of historical accidents in the two cycles (high in Argentina, 
low in Uruguay) and of enduring and different political traditions 
(high in both countries); (ii) an exploration of the differing nature 
of the two cycles, and finally, (iii) to some implications regarding 
the broader, regional turn to the left. Do these stories suggest we 
should expect continuity or new cycles (e.g. to the right) in Lat-
in America? Or should we rather expect the Latin American turn 
to the left to dissolve into diverging stories? The paper concludes 
that the most likely scenario is the latter, “diverging stories”.
Keywords: turn to the left - presidential campaign - civic culture - 
Argentina - Uruguay - storytelling
resumen 
Desde el comienzo del presente siglo Argentina y Uruguay, como 
otros países de la región,  experimentaron un giro hacia la izquier-
da. En la Argentina este giro tomó el nombre de “ciclo kirchne-
rista” (o “ciclo K”) por los presidentes Néstor Kirchner y Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, mientras que en Uruguay es “el ciclo del 
Frente Amplio”, por el partido político que todavía lo lidera. El ciclo 
K argentino terminó con la derrota de su candidato presidencial 
en la elección presidencial de 2015; el ciclo del FA uruguayo conti-
nuará al menos hasta la elección presidencial de 2019.
Los respectivos liderazgos nacionales no fueron los creadores de 
estos giros, pero le dieron forma propia a esa fuerte oleada regio-
nal según la idiosincrasia de cada país. A pesar de las profundas 
similitudes sociales entre Argentina y Uruguay, las diferentes his-
torias y culturas políticas de estos países quedan de manifiesto en 
sus campañas electorales, escenarios privilegiados para observar 
las respectivas culturas políticas “en acción”. Este trabajo explo-
ra similitudes y diferencias entre los giros a la izquierda en el Río 
de la Plata a través del análisis de las campañas presidenciales 
victoriosas de los dos ciclos (2003, 2007 y 2011 en la Argentina y 
2004, 2009 y 2014 en Uruguay).
Este análisis lleva a (i) una evaluación de la importancia relativa 
de los accidentes históricos en ambos ciclos (alta en la Argentina, 
baja en Uruguay) y del impacto de sus diferentes tradiciones polí-
ticas (alto en los dos países); (ii) una exploración del diferente des-
tino y naturaleza de los dos ciclos y, finalmente, (iii) algunas im-
plicaciones para el giro más amplio, regional, hacia la izquierda. 
¿Estas experiencias sugieren que se deberían esperar continuida-
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des o nuevos ciclos (por ejemplo hacia la derecha) en América La-
tina? ¿O debemos esperar que el giro latinoamericano hacia la iz-
quierda se disuelva en historias divergentes de cada país? Este 
artículo concluye que el escenario más probable es este último, el 
de las “historias divergentes”.
Palabras clave: giro a la izquierda - campaña presidencial - cultura 
política - Argentina - Uruguay - storytelling
introduction
In the abundant empirical literature on the left-right di-
mension many, perhaps most academic authors (and all the 
journalists) fail to provide an explicit definition of left and 
right. They probably assume those meanings can be taken 
for granted. Those who do use an explicit definition tend to 
take one of three paths: (i) some formal, academic defini-
tion of what is the political left and right; (ii) the predomi-
nant use of the terms left and right by journalists, politi-
cians and their advisors, and (iii) the way people use those 
terms (according to public opinion polls): this is the least 
common procedure. The formal definitions of the first type 
(academic definitions) tend to converge because they are 
based on historical (mostly European) experience and tra-
ditions. Recent literature has shown that definitions of the 
second type (predominant use by journalists, politicians 
and advisors) tend to coincide with those of the first type, 
probably because they are ultimately based on the aca-
demic literature.3 
Following established practice, then, we will assume 
that “political left” is what most academics, politicians, jour-
nalists and experts see as left, which means that in Latin 
3 See, for example, Wiesehomeier (2010). The third type of definition will not be 
used here. That definition, based in voters’ use of the terms, coincides with 
the other two in most rich democracies. In developing countries and in Latin 
America in particular, however, sometimes it coincides and sometimes it does 
not (González and Queirolo 2013).
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America there was a clear “turn to the left” since the begin-
ning of the century. According to this simple but reasonable 
definition, by 2010 ten out of seventeen countries in conti-
nental Latin America were governed by the left (Queirolo, 
2013). If six out of ten countries turned more or less simul-
taneously to the left, then leftist national leaderships were 
not the absolute “creators” of their respective turns; rather 
they gave national form and substance to a general, region-
al wave.
The national forms of those turns to the left are condi-
tioned by their own political cultures.4 That conditioning 
happens because most actors, including voters, think and 
behave according to the rules of their own culture. Candi-
dates and the professional teams that advise them go a step 
further: they seek to use those rules to their advantage. As 
political or civic culture changes slowly (Almond, 1989), in 
a particular campaign it is rather a constant: a fixed trait 
that cannot be changed in the short run. That is, a condi-
tioning factor which must be taken into account. Presiden-
tial candidates and their closest advisors know it. They tend 
to work in teams, combining their experiences to achieve 
common goals (maximizing their votes and, if possible, win-
ning the election and the presidency). In a context of in-
creasingly professionalized campaigns, a rational pursuit of 
these goals requires taking into close account national po-
litical identities, fears and expectations. That means shap-
ing discourse and actions without contradicting them and, 
whenever possible, using them to strengthen the credibility 
and dependability of their message and narrative.
This does not assume that campaign advisors (or can-
didates) are academics well versed in the sociology of po-
litical cultures. As many successful advertising people, they 
may be practical persons, experienced and well informed, 
4 About the relationship between campaigns and political or civic culture see, 
for example, Domínguez (1998); East Asia Institute, Seoul Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Joong Ang llbo, and Hankook Research Company (2013); Vonderschmitt 
(2012); Wang, Gabay and Shah (2012).
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capable of applying their practical knowledge to attain their 
goals. As a minimum, they are competent interpreters of the 
political cultures within which they work; they do not go 
against its grain. Thus, at least implicitly their work expos-
es the central traits of their civic cultures. True, this does 
not mean that candidates and experts will not err (that is, 
in some instances their interpretations of their political cul-
ture may be wrong), in which case rules inferred from their 
work will also be wrong. In fact, it is certain that sometimes 
they will be wrong. However, the combination of powerful 
self-interest, accumulated experience and teamwork sug-
gests that wrongs will be less frequent than rights. If so, it 
makes sense to see political cultures through their lenses.
National political cultures and histories condition the 
turns to the left and frame electoral campaigns as well. 
Hence in competitive polities those campaigns (particular-
ly presidential ones) can be used to probe the characteris-
tics of national turns to the left. As argued below, the main 
traits of presidential campaigns and turns to the left should 
be consistent, since both are anchored in the same bed-
rock.
In Argentina and Uruguay the nature of presidential 
campaigns (and turns to the left) should differ because, in 
spite of social similarities, the two countries have different 
political cultures and histories. The campaigns of the turn 
to the left were those of 2003, 2007 and 2011 in Argenti-
na, and 2004, 2009 and 2014 in Uruguay. The analysis that 
follows will center in on the essentials of those presiden-
tial campaigns, concentrating in the narrative (“el relato”) 
of the main candidates. From a Latin American perspective, 
powerful political storytelling tends to share several traits 
(D’Adamo and García Beaudoux 2013):
•Conflict and antagonism: narratives present conflicts be-
tween actors, use binary schema and a friend/foe logic;
•Values: narrative is built on general values which are 
used to frame specific issues;
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•Staging of leadership: visual clues (e.g. colors, places, 
clothes) to orient viewers;
•Vision: capability to define, conceptualize, give meaning 
and direction to the political situation;
•Rhetoric and language: use of aspirational language and 
an epic rhetoric;
•Myths: use of exemplary stories illustrating central val-
ues;
•Symbols: convey messages, adorn narratives;
•Argument lines familiar in popular culture: narratives 
and plots rooted in popular culture, politically recycled; 
•Activation of senses: simultaneous activation of senso-
rial channels (sight, sound);
•Activation of emotions: activation of feelings and affec-
tive identifications, and
•Morals: educative knowledge inferred from the stories.
This list is surely neither perfect nor exhaustive. Neverthe-
less, it covers ample ground, and provides an external, in-
dependent guide for the comparison between the Argentin-
ean and Uruguayan cases. 
The following section summarizes briefly the regional 
turn to the left. The third section examines Argentina’s 
presidential campaigns during the Kirchner cycle from the 
perspective sketched above. The fourth section probes the 
Uruguayan case. The final, concluding section points out 
the implications of the analysis.
The turns to the left in Latin America since WWii
According to the definitions discussed above, during the 
first decade of this century most continental Latin Ameri-
can countries were governed by left wing parties or move-
ments; most of them are still governed by the left (in its 
wider sense, meaning “left wing”: to the left of the center, 
including center-left and left). Thus, there was a politically 
significant and unexpected “turn to the left”.
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Although unexpected, it had precedents. Twenty-five 
years after the end of World War II the region had already 
experienced a relatively short turn to the left (though with 
some qualifications, because until the ‘80s many Lat-
in American countries did not have competitive elections). 
In the electoral (or “minimalist”) democracies of the region 
that did have competitive elections, this first turn to the left 
occurred during the years 1969-76 (Queirolo, 2013: 26-32). 
These were Cold War years, when Latin American elites 
and middle classes witnessed the climax of the influence of 
the Cuban revolution and feared radical forms of socialism.
The current turn to the left began in 2001 (loc. cit., pp. 
28 and 33-34), when the third wave of democratizations 
was in full swing. Not all the national turns took place si-
multaneously: Nicaragua and Chile may be seen as the pio-
neers of the current tide. In Nicaragua Daniel Ortega (leader 
of the Sandinista left wing guerrilla) was president in the 
years 1985-90, and again as from 2006. Chile was gov-
erned by a leftist coalition in 1990-2010, and again since 
2014. Venezuela has been Chavista (and left wing) since 
Chávez became president in 1999. Argentina, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Uruguay 
are or have been part of this left turn as well.
There have been debates, however, concerning the 
kind of left that governed or is governing some of the coun-
tries (e.g., whether the turn is actually a red turn or rather a 
“pink” one), the causes of the turn to the left, and its likely 
future.5 But the essential facts are undisputed, at least in the 
terms of the present definition of “left wing”. 
Argentina began its left turn in 2003, and Uruguay in 
2005. The two countries are strongly linked by their co-
lonial and post-colonial history and by the common bor-
der of the Río de la Plata. From the final years of the nine-
teenth century until the end of World War II both countries 
5 For some of the relevant discussions and differing perspectives: Arditi (2008); 
Baker and Greene (2011); Cleary (2006); Levitsky and Roberts (2011); and Ro-
dríguez Garavito et al. (2005).
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received a large European immigration. Uruguayan society 
is the most similar to Argentina’s in Latin America: relative-
ly rich, less unequal than the region and homogeneous. Not 
so their polities, however. Democracy was born in the two 
countries during the first wave of democratizations (Hun-
tington, 1991), but later their paths diverged. Uruguay is 
the Latin American country which has lived longest under 
democratic governments and is one of the three countries 
of the region normally seen as “consolidated democracies” 
(the other two are Chile and Costa Rica), Argentina not so 
much. Uruguay has one of the most institutionalized par-
ty systems of the region; Argentina does not (Mainwaring, 
1995; Payne, 2006). These differences are clearly visible in 
the following discussion.
The Kirchner (“K”) cycle in Argentina
Since mid-twentieth century Argentina’s politics has re-
volved around Peronism, the movement founded by for-
mer president Juan Domingo Perón and his wife Eva Duarte, 
“Evita.” Though the formal name of that movement was 
Justicialism, the name everybody uses is Peronism. The two 
Peronist currents that governed Argentina after the military 
regime which ended in 1983, Menemism and Kirchnerism, 
are also named after their leaders, former presidents Carlos 
Menem and Néstor Kirchner. These labels suggest person-
alization: since the past century the most important politi-
cal tides (and their leading parties) in Argentina have been 
dominated by their leaders.6  
Néstor Kirchner became president in 2003 as leader of 
a new party, Frente para la Victoria (FPV), an offspring from 
6 This includes Yrigoyenism (Hipólito Yrigoyen, at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century), and Alfonsinism, named after the first (non-Peronist) president 
of Argentina’s post military re-democratization, Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989). 
This is not a uniquely Argentinean trait. In Latin America’s political history, 
with some exceptions, strong caudillos tend to be the rule. People identify 
themselves with their leaders, not so much with their parties, giving way to 
“-isms” related to the caudillos’ names (e.g., Sandinism, Varguism, Castrism, 
Chavism).
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the Peronist trunk, with only 22% of the votes. In a coun-
try where voting is compulsory, this shows very low public 
support. He was a former Governor of an outlying Patago-
nian province, sponsored to run for office by the incumbent 
Peronist president, Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003). Presi-
dent Duhalde proposed a person he considered a soft can-
didate who would keep up with the policies he had en-
acted to deal with the economic and institutional crisis of 
2001/2002. The other viable candidates got even fewer 
votes, with the exception of former president Carlos Menem, 
also an heir to Peronism, who got 25% but declined to com-
pete in a second round because all the polls indicated that 
he would lose heavily to Kirchner. 
In this fragmented scenario Néstor Kirchner started to 
build his own power structure, keeping Duhalde’s economic 
team. His wife, Senator Cristina Fernández, and a few Pata-
gonian officials were the core of his team. Kirchner needed 
recognition (and, if possible, long term support) from both 
his party and other parties, as well as from public opinion, 
the mass media and the diverse economic sectors. He was 
determined to show that he was not “soft” at all and that 
he would not allow any former president to dictate his gov-
ernment policies. Despite this, he kept Duhalde’s economic 
team for two years, because its leader, economist Roberto 
Lavagna, was successfully fighting the crisis and was rela-
tively trusted by national elites, a trust that Kirchner did not 
enjoy. At first Kirchner needed Lavagna’s help.
The K cycle included three periods: Néstor Kirchner ad-
ministration (2003-2007) and two of his wife’s, Cristina 
Fernández (2008-2011 and 2012-2015); it ended in 2015, 
when the Kirchnerist candidate lost the presidential elec-
tion. For the present purpose, it is revealing that the so-
called “K cycle” had no Day 1. The official story claims that 
it began exactly on May 25, 2003 when Néstor Kirchner 
swore as president, but it did not feel that way at the time, 
not even for the few early K supporters. At the beginning of 
Kirchner’s presidency, nobody thought it was the start of 
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a turn to the left. Many feared that it was going to be diffi-
cult for a president with so little popular support to have a 
moderately successful presidency, nobody thought that he 
would begin a political cycle of his own. Neither Duhalde 
nor anybody else in the opposition parties thought of him 
that way. As the images below indicate, he was mostly seen 
as Duhalde’s creature. He posed as anti-Carlos Menem, and 
so did Duhalde; this intra-Peronism antagonism did not dif-
ferentiate Kirchner from Duhalde. In his 2003 presidential 
campaign, Kirchner did not promise a “turn to the left.”
In short, the K cycle was born within Peronism, as a 
consequence of President Duhalde’s decision on who was 
going to compete in the 2003 presidential election to de-
feat former President Carlos Menem. Duhalde chose Kirch-
ner among several potential candidates and his choice was 
not “necessary” or determined by previous political devel-
opments. Yet, once in office Kirchner knew how to make 
good use of this opportunity. He built the K cycle from with-
in the government, but this was not easily perceived until 
the midterm elections of 2005. 
The 2003 campaign: left, Clarín cover, echoing the idea of confrontation be-
tween Menem and Kirchner. Right, anonymous poster found in the streets dur-
ing the 2003 campaign showing Kirchner as Duhalde’s puppet.
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President Kirchner developed a series of policies per-
ceived as populist by the opposition. Helped by the eco-
nomic reboot achieved thanks to Duhalde-Lavagna poli-
cies and a favorable international context, he was able to 
strengthen presidential powers. To further his authority and 
legitimacy he built a heroic myth: his own leadership sto-
ry, which erased the role of Duhalde and Lavagna in fight-
ing the crisis. This construction took shape with the help of 
publicists7 and strong investment in advertising. Through-
out the years, investment in government communication 
grew exponentially, strengthening Kirchner’s version of re-
cent history (the story, “el relato”) in the public debate. 
The Chief of Staff’s office states that the yearly budget 
for press and communication grew from less than 80 mil-
lion pesos in 2004 to almost one thousand million in 2014, 
that is, from US$ 27 million to US$ 142 million a decade later 
(Chart 1; Amado y Amadeo, 2014).8 The government com-
munication policy was aggressive, ubiquitous and profes-
sional. It contracted public relations resources from the cor-
porate sector (Amadeo, Amado and Aruguete, 2013), using a 
complex system of communication channels articulated in a 
way that allowed the government to reach different targets 
in a permanent communication scheme (Amado y Amadeo, 
2012). Broadcasting communication tools were and still are 
the priority; advertising on TV, newspapers and radio be-
came a rule and a huge budget was assigned for this.
Casa Rosada (the presidential offices, www.casarosada.
gov.ar) became the main information agency in the country, 
with resources a TV channel would envy. Only official cam-
eras, used to feed the rest of the media, broadcasting ev-
ery event in which the President speaks. No other cameras 
7 See “De cómo Arturo Jauretche se suma a la campaña K”, interview to Fernando 
Braga Menéndez published in Página 12 (newspaper close to Kirchner), March 
14, 2006, http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-64274-2006-03-14.html 
[downloaded Oct.16, 2014].
8 Using US dollar/peso conversion rates at the beginning of each year in the 
website of Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, http://www.bcra.gov.ar/
index.asp
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were allowed when the President was addressing the pub-
lic. Official sponsoring of sports events or artistic shows be-
came a rule. The government broadcasts all football match-
es on TV, and exhibits government advertisements before, 
during and after each match. To build the official story, the 
Kirchner administrations used diverse tactics: new tech-
nologies (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube channels), 
strong visual designs, renaming and rebranding policies, 
press officials with no access to the media and the jour-
nalists (the spokesman used to be called “the mute spokes-
man” by his colleagues from the media).
Chart 1:  
Budget applied to communication of Presidency of the nation  
(in millions of pesos) 
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59,10
79,96
94,65
160,16
125,65
225,10
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161,22
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828,20
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1.191,56
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950,73
Source: Amado y Amadeo (2014); national budgets 2003-2014.
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 6 63
How did the Kirchner governments use these unprec-
edented communicational resources? We will not ana-
lyze here the 2003 campaign because, as we have already 
shown, it is not part of the K cycle: it is the circumstance 
from which the cycle was born. The identification of the K 
cycle with the left, at most insinuated in 2003, began to 
take shape shortly before the midterm elections of 2005, 
but crystallized in Cristina Fernández’s presidential cam-
paigns of 2007 and 2011. Consequently, we will focus 
on these two campaigns and the Kirchnerist narrative in 
them.9
In 2007 Néstor Kirchner’s wife ran for president estab-
lishing the idea of “continuity of change.” The Kirchners 
formed short-term alliances that allowed them to win in 
different provinces. These alliances were shaped with the 
help of the most unexpected actors, including Peronist his-
torical enemies and candidates of the Unión Cívica Radical 
(Radical Civic Union, a liberal party that strongly confront-
ed conservatives by the end of the XIX century, thus giv-
ing way to its assertive name). In this way, Kirchner defeat-
ed rivals within his own party and strengthened the idea 
of “transversalidad” (transversality), which meant that the 
Frente Para la Victoria (FPV) intersected the party system, 
reaching almost all its corners. Peronists were mostly FPV, 
as well as many from the supposedly opposition parties. In 
order to show commitment with this transversal spirit Nés-
tor Kirchner chose a radical (Julio Cobos, a provincial lead-
er of Unión Cívica Radical), to run for the Vicepresidency in 
Cristina Fernández’s ticket.
The electoral campaign was an extension of govern-
ment communication. During the campaign, Cristina Fernán-
dez gave very few speeches, while President Kirchner was 
extremely active showing his administration’s successes. 
Fernández showed herself as Senator working for the “gov-
9 The 2015 presidential campaign was lost by the Kirchnerist candidate, Daniel 
Scioli, thus ending the K cycle. That campaign took place after the completion 
of this paper.
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ernment’s inclusive model” and the campaign was main-
ly advertising on television, graphic media and radio. The 
strongest message was that of “Dolores Argentina”,10 a girl 
who symbolized the country, born during the 2001 crisis, 
whose life endures all the evils the country suffered during 
the crisis, and finally names the different achievements of 
the Kirchner administration. Thanks to them, Dolores’s fami-
ly saw her become a strong girl despite her distressing birth. 
The girl (that is, the country) was now young, happy and 
normal, as a set of renowned actors, sports stars, scientists, 
teachers and citizens pointed out in the advertising piece. 
The whole of Fernández’s campaign was based on the idea 
that Cristina would keep up with her husband’s policies, 
which amounted to a government model, “el modelo K.”
2007: “The change is only beginning”; “We know what’s still needed. We know 
how to do it. Cristina, Cobos and you”.
During Fernández’s first administration more money 
went to public communication than ever before in Argen-
tine history (Amadeo, Amado and Aruguete, 2013; Amado 
and Amadeo, 2014). All the messages reflected Jean-Ma-
rie Domenach’s six rules of propaganda (Domenach, 1986, 
pp. 47-89): the rule of simplification and unique enemy, the 
rule of distortion and caricature, the rule of orchestrating, 
the rule of transfer, the rule of unanimity and contagion and 
the rule of counterpropaganda. All of them can be seen in 
the K government communication (Amadeo y Amado, 2013; 
Amado, 2014).
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wQKk5amxFU 
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Domenech’s rule of transfer, in particular, states that 
“propaganda always operates on a preexistent base… [as a] 
national mythology” (1986:66), which may include the “re-
animation of past myths and creation of the myths to come” 
(id., p.91). This was clearly seen throughout her first ad-
ministration. She was portrayed with the late leader Juan 
Perón, his wife Eva Duarte (“Evita”) and her own husband, 
Néstor Kirchner; the Kirchners were the natural heirs of 
Perón and Evita.
2011: The strength of history - CFK (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) 2011, Cris-
tina (colors), Perón, Evita and Kirchner (grey shadows); The strength of Cristina, 
Cristina (colors) over a river of followers.
2007: In a deliberately retro format, from left to right: Evita, Perón, Néstor and 
Cristina K.
Néstor Kirchner died on October 27, 2010. From that day on 
and for three years, she dressed in black. When the official 
campaign for reelection started in 2011, she had been speak-
ing of her life companion for months, usually referring to 
“him”, without saying his name. She positioned herself again 
as the living heir, now of the K model, and reinforced the idea 
of “either with me or against the people” (Amado, 2014). 
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In the 2011 campaigns, the slogans said “Néstor with 
Perón, the people with Cristina”. Her strength came from 
her convictions and from the mythical civic heroes she di-
rectly represented, first and foremost her late husband Nés-
tor. Fernández turned her husband into a founding father 
and herself into the natural heiress to the K model.
The complete 2011 campaign showed Fernández’s 
strength. All the television spots stressed the concept of 
Cristina being as strong as her ideas, her predecessors and 
her mission.11 This very idea was proposed by D’Adamo and 
García Beaudoux when they stated that myths (using ex-
emplary stories illustrating central values) and symbols that 
convey messages and adorn narratives are key elements to 
consolidate a story. Both elements combined exert strong 
cognitive and affective effects on the audience (D’Adamo 
and García Beaudoux 2013, pp. 62-63). Gabriel Slavin-
sky (2013) states that there were three main communica-
tion axes in the campaign: the people’s support for the late 
president Kirchner, the concept of “strength” and the deep-
ening of the K model, of the K cycle.
The campaign was based on conventional TV and radio 
spots and on outdoor advertising. As a candidate, Fernán-
dez rarely addressed the voters in public rallies during the 
campaign: she spoke as President in office, which strength-
ened her position compared to the other candidates. Cristi-
na Fernández is eloquent and feels comfortable speaking in 
public, so she delivered strong and long live speeches about 
public policies she launched during the electoral campaign.
This strategy positioned her as an effective leader, 
and the campaign spots repeated citizens’ success stories, 
which were possible thanks to the Kirchners’ econom-
ic socially inclusive model. These spots aimed at activating 
senses and emotions (D’Adamo and García Beaudoux 2013, 
pp. 64-65) by using and reinforcing the image of the candi-
date in a leadership position, on a stage, dressed in black, 
11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bn6dSnBhdtI 
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under a generous rain of confetti with the national colors, 
cheered by an enthusiastic flag-waving crowd while a tri-
umphal music was being played. 
Cristina Fernández won her reelection by a landslide 
(she got 54%), and the FPV also defeated the opposition in 
Congress. The K model was a complete success. What start-
ed as a weak presidency in 2003 consolidated itself in 2011 
as a powerful political cycle.
When looking at the 2007 and 2011 presidential cam-
paigns from the perspective of D’Adamo and García Beau-
doux (2013) categories summarizing “the typical struc-
ture of political storytelling,” some of their characteristics 
stand out. The Kirchner’s narrative expressed a stigmatiz-
ing Manichaeism, which grew between 2003 and 2015 in 
a constant crescendo. Néstor Kirchner used to point at dif-
ferent adversaries one at a time: “the anti-democratic mili-
tary”, “the farmers’ lobby”, “the greedy businessmen” (and 
“the corporations”, or the “corpo”), “the obscure Catho-
lic Church”, “foreign oil companies”, “powerful countries” 
(like the US). Public enemies were based on old ideas still 
alive in the popular imagery. Thus, Kirchner began a tra-
dition of “you are either with me or against the Argentine 
people” dichotomy that held on under Cristina Fernán-
dez’s presidency.12 D’Adamo and García Beaudoux (2013, 
p. 57) underscored the idea of “conflict and antagonism” as 
an important characteristic of successful storytelling, since 
narratives present conflicts between actors, use binary 
schema and a friend/foe logic. It was easy for these bina-
ry illusions to permeate the public agenda: Argentine civic 
culture has a history of confrontations. Luis Alberto Romero 
says that these confrontations were already present at the 
beginning of the 20th century, when populist anti-imperi-
12 See President Fernández’s inaugural speech of the 113rd period of ordinary ses-
sions. National Congress, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 1st, 2015. http://www. 
casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/discursos/28418-discurso-de-la-presidenta-
cristina-fernandez-en-la-inauguracion-del-133-periodo-de-sesisones-ordi-
narias-del-congreso-nacional
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alist nationalisms were born. These ideas were recovered 
and fostered by the first peronismo and during the K cycle 
(Mercado, 2013).13 
In each of the two campaigns that took Cristina Fernán-
dez to the presidency (2007 and 2011), the narrative re-
peated itself, and the storytelling process was identical. 
While each campaign enhanced one resource over others, 
the full set of rules proposed by D’Adamo and García Beau-
doux (2013) for efficient storytelling is present. Conflict and 
antagonism can be seen every time the K candidate speaks 
about the people and about those economic and political 
interests that try to damage the people. National Peronist 
values and traditions are held as exclusive K products (em-
powerment of the poor, social justice). The myths (Perón, 
Evita, Néstor, and Cristina as well) are shown as nation-
al heroes. The strong leader and president looks after the 
less fortunate, has a vision, gives meaning and direction to 
every political situation, possesses rhetorical abilities and 
uses aspirational language and an epic oratory. Symbols, 
such as Perón himself are still alive and are being used as a 
lighthouse in a storm, and now a new guide appears in the 
skyline: Néstor Kirchner. None of these tools would be use-
ful if Argentinean civic culture was not permeable to them, 
but it is. The narratives and plots proposed are deeply root-
ed in popular culture and have been conveniently recycled. 
Every spot, every piece of advertisement activates senses 
and emotions and shows the citizens that voting to extend 
the K cycle is the morally correct thing to do.
The Frente Amplio (fA, Broad front) cycle in uruguay
Uruguay has the region’s oldest party system and one of the 
oldest in the world (Sotelo Rico, 1999). From the first half 
of the nineteenth century to the last years of the twenti-
eth century Uruguayan politics was dominated by two par-
13 Luis Alberto Romero, “En el país del complot permanente”, La Nación, March 10, 
2015. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1774781-en-el-pais-del-complot-permanente 
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ties, the Partido Colorado (Colorados, “reds”, though not in 
its usual political meaning, but as a practical answer to the 
need of distinguishing friend from foe in the civil wars of 
the nineteenth century) and the Partido Nacional (Naciona-
listas or Blancos, whites). The Colorados were akin to the 
liberal Latin American parties of the nineteenth century and 
the Blancos, to the conservative ones. 
The FA cycle was built in a slow process throughout sev-
eral generations. The FA was initially more a coalition than 
a party (now the opposite is true; it may be seen as a high-
ly fractionalized party, as the Colorado and Blanco parties). 
Most of its founders felt themselves heirs to the early Eu-
ropean socialist, communist and even anarchist left. The 
Socialist and Communist parties, born at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, were its core. Most FA militants and 
cadres still feel closer to the radical versions of this tradi-
tion than to their later social democratic incarnations. This 
“classical” left has always controlled unions. As in Europe, 
unions were its initial power base, strengthened by an al-
liance with small intellectual minorities of the Uruguayan 
middle classes (when the FA was founded; they are no lon-
ger minorities). The FA itself was born as a coalition-cum-
movement in 1971, led by that classical left allied to splinter 
groups from the traditional parties and the Christian De-
mocracy.
Two years after the birth of the FA, a military coup led to 
a long and harsh authoritarian government (1973-84). Ex-
cept in its last year, public political life was frozen by the 
military. Electoral results were almost frozen as well. Those 
of the 1984 presidential election were similar to those of 
the preceding one, that of 1971. After this freezing, howev-
er, the electoral growth of the FA began. In 1994, ten years 
and two elections after the re-democratization election of 
1984, the party system got into a triple draw: Colorados, 
Blancos and Frentistas (in that order) received about one 
third of the vote each. In 1999 the FA became the most vot-
ed party, and it has remained so. During the 1999 campaign 
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past electoral results were analyzed comparing the FA on 
the one hand with the sum of the votes of the old parties, 
Colorados and Blancos, on the other. That analysis, which 
led to a good forecast of the FA’s vote in 1999, was based 
solely on historical trends (González, 1999). Since 1999 
those two parts are approximately two halves; in 1999 the 
FA was the most voted party, although the smaller half.
In the following election, October 2004, the FA be-
came the bigger half, getting an absolute majority. It won 
the presidency (without the 
need of a second round) and 
absolute majorities of its own 
in both legislative houses. 
On March 1st, 2005, Tabaré 
Vázquez was inaugurated as 
Uruguay’s first president from 
the left. Exactly five years 
later FA’s José Mujica suc-
ceeded him, and in March 1st, 
2015, Vázquez became presi-
dent for the second time.14 In 
the three elections of this cy-
cle (2004, 2009, 2014) the FA 
has been the bigger half (though with a decreasing share 
of votes). After three presidential wins in a row with ma-
jorities of its own in the legislature, it was clear that the FA 
had opened a new political cycle, becoming what is usually 
called a predominant party (González, 2015). 
This cycle may not be the first Uruguayan left wing gov-
ernment. At least the government of the Colorado Batllis-
ta fraction (named for José Batlle y Ordóñez, twice presi-
dent), at the beginning of the twentieth century, may also 
be seen as such. But Batllism was part of the traditional 
Colorado Party, born in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
14 Presidential reelection is allowed in Uruguay, but not in two consecutive terms 
(Argentina’s legislation allows reelection, including two, but not three consecu-
tive periods). 
Vázquez, 2004: let’s change.
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tury. The political roots, theory, language, practices and he-
roes of those Batllist were different from those of the heirs 
of the classical left which built the FA. To be more precise: 
the FA cycle marks the first time this classical left governed 
the country. 
The 2004 electoral results were not “accidental” in any 
meaningful sense. First, Vázquez was the natural presiden-
tial candidate of the FA. He was the most popular Uruguay-
an politician of any party; he was a respected oncologist; in 
1989 he had won for the left its first significant executive 
position, as Intendente of Montevideo,15 the capital city and 
departamento (province), home of nearly half the country’s 
population. Second, electoral trends were unequivocal. 
Four years before the 2004 election González and Queiro-
lo (2000) wrote that, according to existing trends, by 2004 
the FA’s voters were expected to be somewhat more numer-
ous than the sum of the voters of the traditional parties, as 
indeed happened.
Third, in the 2004 campaign the FA did its homework; 
it did not merely wait to see historical trends “happen”. In 
1999 the left apparently thought that they were winning 
an ideological battle: voters would be deserting tradition-
al parties because they were adopting the left’s ideas. So, 
the candidate said repeatedly “we are going to shake the 
roots of the trees.” This was a good motto for those who al-
ready voted the left wing, not for the voters that were ready 
to abandon traditional parties but did not want to rock the 
boat. As they were necessary to win an absolute majori-
ty, the FA became the most voted party, but lost the sec-
ond round of the presidential election to the Colorado can-
didate, Jorge Batlle. Five years later, in 2004, the FA had 
learnt the lesson: their central theme was again the need to 
change, but a change “the Uruguayan way”.  
Plainly speaking, “a change the Uruguayan way” means 
without rocking the boat: a change that would improve (al-
15 “Intendente” is a position somewhere between mayor and governor.
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most) everybody’s condition; very few had something to 
lose or fear from that kind of change.16 A week before the 
Uruguayan election, one of the main newspapers of Buenos 
Aires, La Nación, carried its final, long report on the election 
titled precisely “Elections: a change the Uruguayan way”17 
(emphasis added). This “Uruguayan way” theme was ap-
propriate to placate the doubts of those who wanted mod-
erate, “controlled” change.
The campaign did not limit itself to generic declarations; 
there were very concrete announcements as well. Vázquez 
declared (in Washington, from the IMF offices, a symbolic, 
meaningful place for everybody) that if he won, Danilo As-
tori would be his Finance minister. Astori was (and is) a re-
spected economist with a reputation for moderation and 
common sense (say, a figure somewhat to the left from Ar-
gentina’s Lavagna). Astori was indeed Vazquez’s Finance 
minister during his full term, and he delivered what was 
expected of him. Vázquez’s first presidency was later wide-
ly seen as a left wing government (mainly because of its so-
cial policies, including those regarding unions), but a social 
democratic one. It was a moderate left wing government. 
The World Bank, the IMF, the IADB and almost all local pro-
fessional observers saw it in these terms.
Astori delivered on his basic responsibility as well. 
Vázquez’s government was very successful on social and 
economic terms. It is possible to discuss to what extent 
those results were due to his and Astori’s policies or to fa-
vorable “rear winds”, but the results themselves are clear, 
and they happened under Vázquez’s watch. Hence he left 
the presidency with popularity levels unheard of in Uru-
guay since the beginning of professional public opinion 
polls.
When the 2009 presidential campaign began, all ob-
servers, including the team in charge of the FA’s campaign, 
16 Formally, it was a Paretian or quasi-Paretian change.
17 “Elecciones: un cambio a la uruguaya”, La Nación, October 24, 2010. http://
www.lanacion.com.ar/647643-elecciones-un-cambio-a-la-uruguaya
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thought that the left’s natural strategy was one of continu-
ity with its successful first government. This was not easy, 
because the presidential candidate was José “Pepe” Mujica, 
a former Tupamaro guerrilla leader who had spent many 
years prisoner of the military in harsh, illegal conditions (he 
was one of the few so called “hostages”). Besides his guer-
rilla past, Mujica, unlike Vázquez, was not like any previous 
Uruguayan president, neither in his looks (unkempt, never 
wearing a suit or a tie) nor in his language (bad mouthed, 
speaking in a rough and somewhat “rural” way, mispro-
nouncing lots of words). But Mujica is a practical man, and 
he wanted to win.18 He personally chose his campaign’s 
director, Francisco Vernazza, an advertising man from the 
commercial world but already experienced in political cam-
paigns (for the opposition, though; he was probably deci-
sive in President Sanguinetti’s 1994 victory for his second 
term). This decision ruffled many feathers in the left, but it 
worked.
Mujica changed his looks halfway to that of a “normal” 
president (regular shave, neat hair; jacket or even suit, but 
no tie)19 and, most importantly, the message of continuity 
and moderation was strongly reaffirmed. The campaign did 
not speak explicitly of “continuity,” but that was its dom-
inant idea. The moderation theme was as much or even 
more present than in 2004. Astori was now Mujica’s vice-
presidential candidate, expected to be an economics tsar in 
Mujica’s government as well.
The moderation issue was so important that the cam-
paign deliberately understated Mujica’s role: “Danilo [As-
tori] is second to none…We want him first, going halves 
with me” (in Mujica’s blog “El Pepe [Mujica] tal cual es,” 
July 11, 2009). Astori “was a boon for the campaign…he 
18 Some observers thought that at least part of his public image was a deliberate 
construction. If so, it was not difficult to adjust that image to the new situation. 
19 A careful equilibrium: change enough to be clearly visible as a genuine ef-
fort and a signal, but not as a barely credible “surrender” of his former self, or 
worse, as a lie, a hypocritical electoral trick.
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[made] us less unpredictable…and less radical;” after the 
primaries (“internas”), since day one of the campaign, ads 
“never presented Mujica alone;”20 his usual companion was 
precisely Astori. Moreover, the campaign “never used the 
phrase ‘Mujica for president’.” (loc.cit.). On “radicalism”, the 
campaign “signaled belonging to the global social demo-
cratic space, upholding the idea of democratic coexistence, 
and kept silent on third world socialism [socialismo tercer-
mundista], Chávez and partners” (loc. cit.).
Five years later, in 2014, the FA campaign did not be-
gin very well, but this was more because of tactical mat-
ters than strategic problems. Once the campaign adjusted 
course, things reverted to “normal,” and the election results 
were very similar to those of 2009. The initial motto (“va-
mos bien”, “we are doing well”: not a literal translation, but 
close to its actual meaning) did not work because it did not 
take into account the fatigue of ten years of government by 
the same party. By 2014, the FA showed many aged, impor-
tant political figures present in both administrations, and 
slowly diminishing returns due to failing rear winds and/
or inadequate policies (the share of the two factors being 
difficult to disentangle for voters and experts alike). Never-
theless, most observers (and the FA campaign) thought that 
20 Francisco Vernazza, the campaign’s director, interviewed by Victoria Contar-
tese (Contartese, 2014).
2009 campaign: Left, An honest government, a first class country, Astori and 
Mujica (without tie). Right, For a first class country! / A productive, caring and 
educated country / Mujica - Astori.
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the central theme for the FA had to be again that of conti-
nuity with its two previous governments, overall seen as 
successful or very successful by voters and elites. The main 
criticisms from intellectuals and the political opposition 
concerned not wrongdoings but inactions, what should had 
been done but was not. This, though, involving counterfac-
tuals, was not a good starting point for a political offensive 
against the governing party.
Because of his political past Tabaré Vázquez himself per-
sonified the idea of continuity; this was not a problem (as 
it had been in Mujica’s campaign). Just in case, and to re-
inforce the ideas of moderation and not rocking the boat, 
Astori was again on duty: Vázquez said that if he won, As-
tori would be his Finance minister (exactly as ten years be-
fore), as it was indeed the case. “Renewal” issues (not well 
served by the Vázquez/Astori tandem) were addressed with 
a vice presidential candidate a generation younger than 
Vázquez who was a popular, ascending politician by his 
own merits (Raúl Sendic). 
2014: Danilo Astori, once more proclaimed 
as Finance sminister if the FA wins.
2014: Tabaré and Raúl Sendic.
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The problematic motto “we are doing well” was finally 
substituted by the one that did the job: “Uruguay does not 
stop” (“Uruguay no se detiene”)21. It conveyed simultane-
ously two central ideas: there was significant progress, but 
not enough; the country had to go further (and the FA, re-
sponsible for that progress, was the appropriate leader for 
what still had to be done). This caught the voters´ mood.
The TV spots (and street posters) carrying this motto, 
“Uruguay does not stop”, focused on the successes of the 
FA governments: “Lowest poverty index of Latin America,” 
“Biggest middle class in Latin America,” and its implications: 
“Such a country should not stop”. The ads underscored the 
credibility of their messages (at least for educated people, 
opinion leaders) indicating the independent sources of its 
claims: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Ca-
ribbean (ECLAC, CEPAL in Spanish); United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP, PNUD in Spanish).
Three years after Cristina Fernández’s win in 2011, and 
perhaps inspired by that campaign, the 2014 FA’s cam-
paign in Uruguay also appealed to the idea of strength in a 
spot signed by the most voted fraction of the FA, Mujica’s. It 
showed voters signaling “three” with their fingers, referring 
to the (expected) third consecutive FA electoral victory (and 
playing with its similarity to the traditional “V” sign). The 
21 Jingle: “Uruguay no se detiene,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHHt_zt-
Fzy4; 2014 FA spots,  https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLP16VMmbHa2
aDLrnT_YahuKp5s5n5jkNx 
2014 campaign: Left, The biggest middle class in LA, UNDP. Right, The lowest 
poverty index in LA, ECLAC.
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text read: “People’s strength / The strength of the people 
going forward / Together for the third time.” Unlike what 
happened in Argentina, the spot did not show candidates 
or FA leaders, just common people, underscoring the idea 
that what mattered was their strength.22
Uruguayan observers tend to see their political cam-
paigns as conflictive and polarized. Surveys suggest that 
voters tend to agree, particularly regarding the 2004 cam-
paign, and they dislike those levels of conflict. On a com-
parative basis, however, observers who follow political 
campaigns in both Argentina and Uruguay see far higher 
levels of polarization in Argentina, at least since 2004. 
Nevertheless, in the 2004 campaign the FA did criticize 
both traditional parties heavily. But this was not outland-
ish: people were unsatisfied, angry with Blancos and Colo-
rados, and tempers were short because everybody realized 
that it was a critical moment. In 2009 the levels of parti-
san conflict were lower than in 2004. An analysis of the 
2009 campaign concluded that the only confrontational ad-
vertising strategy was that of the Blancos, which used some 
negative ads; the strategies of both Colorados and Frentis-
tas tended to avoid confrontation (Mancuello, 2010, p.15). 
In this regard the spots of the FA were not negative; they 
tended not to mention the opposition, focusing on the vir-
tues of the FA’s first government instead (loc.cit., p.13). In 
2014, particularly in the last months of the campaign, the 
situation was similar or even less confrontational than in 
2009. The main slogan of the Blanco´s presidential can-
didate, Luis Lacalle Pou, was “Por la positiva” (“In a posi-
tive way”). In those final months of the campaign Vázquez 
maintained the non-confrontational approach of the 2009 
campaign: not mentioning the opposition, concentrating on 
the virtues of ten years of FA government, and describing 
what he was going to do in case of victory. Consistent with 
22 See https://cablera.telam.com.ar/Multimedia/Fotos/Thumbs/201410/tn_13a0b
9a5222b61f824b908f5ed458af2_653x530.jpg
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all of the above, public opinion polls in early 2015 showed 
that the percentage of voters who said the campaign was 
“respectful” was significantly higher than in 2009. In short: 
the level of polarization in the last campaign of the cycle, 
that of 2014, was far lower than in the initial campaign, in 
2004.
Thus, returning to D’Adamo and García Beaudoux´s cat-
egories to analyze political narratives, for the current pur-
pose the main characteristics of the FA campaigns from 
2004 to 2014 can be summed up as follows:
•the level of polarization, of stigmatizing Manichaeism 
decreased significantly;
•the ultimate values and goals present in the three FA 
campaigns have always involved social and economic 
issues. These are values of the classical left: for the low-
ly people, for social justice, for a strong state acting as a 
shield for the poor and the weak (an economically very 
active state);
•colors were important as symbols, as they have always 
been in Uruguayan campaigns (and in most competitive 
polities as well). With regard to colors, the relevant point 
is which colors, and how they related to their competi-
tors’. As seen in the images above, the FA’s colors are 
red, blue and white. Red is the color of the Colorados; 
blue is the color of the Blancos;
•these, plus white, are the colors of Artigas’s flag, the his-
torical federal caudillo of the early nineteenth century 
universally seen as Uruguay’s founding father.23 These 
colors, added to the political discourse of the FA since its 
foundation, strongly underscore that the FA’s founding 
myths are truly national. They somehow include those 
of its rivals, Blancos and Colorados; they are older than 
them, older than the country’s party system;
23 Artigas and his ideas were the main theme of president Vázquez´s inaugural 
speech in April, 2015; see http://www.22universal.com/oscars-2015/tabare-
vazquez-presidencia-discurso-inaugural-ideario-artiguista-referencia-guia.html
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•this national, inclusive character of the FA’s discourse is 
clearly visible before its victory in 2004. 
Explaining the strategy of former president Mujica´s FA 
group for “reaching out to new voters in traditional par-
ty strongholds,” Lucía Topolansky, now a FA senator, said 
in 2003: “We usually have someone [a traditional caudi-
llo with a local political network] acting as a bridge, and 
then we go and try, very slowly, to talk to the people. We 
reach the Blancos with a ‘ruralist’ and ‘Artiguist’ discourse. 
And they also like our rebellious past as ‘Tupamaros,’ be-
cause that is the root of Blanco identity. Meanwhile, we 
reach the Colorados by talking about the old [former Colo-
rado president] Batlle. However, if you tell them about Marx 
and Lenin, or about Frenteamplismo, forget it” (Luna 2014, 
p. 235).24
Conclusions
Comparing the victorious campaigns of Argentina´s and 
Uruguay´s turns to the left, some similarities and some big 
differences stand out. The main similarity by far is the es-
sential content of their political discourse, common to clas-
sical left and Latin American left wing populisms. From that 
point of view, these are indeed turns to the left. The par-
ticular style and wording of each discourse (more than the 
substance itself) flavors the Argentinean version as nearer 
to that of LA populisms, and the Uruguayan version to that 
of the traditional left. In Argentina that discourse is not spe-
cifically Kirchnerist; the ideas, the ways of presenting them 
and the words themselves are those of its Peronist roots. In 
Uruguay some of the ideas and words are shared with the 
colorado’s first Batllism, one century ago, but the ways in 
which they are put forward and discussed are the FA’s own, 
from the classical left.
24 Senator Topolansky, an ex-Tupamaro guerrilla now national FA leader, is for-
mer president Mujica’s wife. 
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The first and foremost difference involves what we have 
called “stigmatizing Manichaeism”. That binary scheme and 
its companion friend/foe logic were high from the start in K 
campaigns (particularly from the 2005 mid-term elections 
onwards). Their polarizing accents increased steadily, as if 
it were necessary to add more fuel to the fire to obtain the 
same results. This progression suggests that those levels of 
conflict and antagonism, at least within certain limits, are 
somehow expected by Argentinean voters. These traits may 
be part of a successful political strategy only because they 
are part of the political culture of its audience.
This, in turn, is consistent with the views of analysts 
from very different intellectual traditions, from historic re-
visionists (some of them close to Kirchnerism) to liberals 
(closer to the opposition) and others, as Luis Alberto Romero, 
quoted above. They think that the confrontational attitudes 
of Argentineans were born in the nineteenth century and, 
according to L. A. Romero, they were reborn and strength-
ened once and again: with Yrigoyenism at the beginning of 
the twentieth century; with Peronism by mid-century, and 
with Kirchnerism since the beginning of the 21st century. 
These attitudes have long included mistrust and fear of an-
tinational plots from foreign powers and actors that would 
cause all (or many) national problems.
In Uruguay just the opposite seems true. The Maniche-
an tones were relatively high in 2004, but they eventu-
ally softened a lot. This suggests that the initial, relative-
ly high levels of conflict in the FA’s discourse were due to 
the particular circumstance of a rattling change of the party 
system caused by deep popular dissatisfactions. This soft-
ening is instrumentally consistent with a political culture 
which today is relatively hostile to high levels of political 
conflict. Uruguayan nationalism is also less obsessed with 
the wrongdoings of foreign nations and actors as cause of 
national problems, following perhaps a long tradition. An 
often quoted passage of the Artigas’s Provisory Land Reg-
ulation of 1815 speaks of “bad Europeans and worse Amer-
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icans [‘Americans’ in that context meaning what we call 
today Uruguayans]” as those whose lands would be expro-
priated, implying that the actions of some locals´ were con-
sidered by Artigas as more damaging (morally, substantive-
ly) than foreigners’.
Levels of polarization are directly related to the nature 
of founding myths. The most important myths of the politi-
cal discourse of the FA are not “its own;” they are older than 
the Republic itself, tied to its birth in the Artiguist legacy. 
The FA considers itself superior to the older parties because 
it incarnates those foundational traditions better than they 
do, but all the parties share a common starting point. This 
was different in Argentina. The political myths of Kirch-
nerism which are most visible in the campaigns are mostly 
those of the first, mid-century Peronism, and partly of the 
second Peronism (when Perón returned to government) and 
some of its actors, as the Juventud Peronista (JP: Peronist 
Youth). These are not national myths; they belong to one 
of the country’s traditions, that of Peronism, and not to a 
single, encompassing national tradition. In this sense, be-
tween Kirchnerism and opposition there would be little or 
no shared ground.
The levels of personalization in the political discourses of 
the two cycles are also different. At first sight this is not the 
case. Whereas in Argentina Kirchnerism and Peronism are 
labels everybody uses, in Uruguay many terms, as Vazquism 
or Mujiquism, might play similar roles. In Uruguay, howev-
er, these terms are always understood as representing parts 
of a wider project. “The FA cycle” is not an optional name, 
but the only one that accurately describes the cycle for all 
actors involved. It is not a term derived from a person, but 
from an institution, the Frente Amplio. In Argentina, the on-
ly natural term for the K cycle is Kirchnerism, a strictly per-
sonal term. The formal equivalent of the Uruguayan FA (or 
“frentismo”, “frenteamplismo”) in Argentina is almost cer-
tainly not so much Kirchnerism as Peronism itself. In either 
case this compares a personal image (Perón or Kirchner in 
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Argentina) to an institutional one (the FA in Uruguay), un-
derscoring significant differences in the levels of political 
personality cult of both countries.
Neither cycle is entirely national. Both belong to a wider 
turn to the left, meaning that they respond to global forc-
es common to many Latin American countries. Both cycles 
somehow translate these global causes into national con-
sequences and each translation is shaped by local political 
cultures. Hence these processes took different forms since 
their beginnings. The K cycle originated in a concrete deci-
sion: President Duhalde’s selection of Néstor Kirchner as his 
presidential candidate in 2003. The FA cycle looks rather as 
the natural arrival point for a process that evolved through 
almost half a century. By the beginning of the 21st century 
the FA was the only political force capable of capitalizing on 
popular dissatisfaction with traditional parties. Hence the 
FA policies were to a good extent conditioned by its insti-
tutional history, whereas K policies were highly dependent 
on Néstor Kirchner’s personality. Political cultures also dif-
ferentiated the paths went through by both cycles. Argen-
tina’s increasing polarization was allowed or even fostered 
by its civic culture; Uruguay’s political culture discouraged 
further polarization.
The K cycle was heavily dependent on its leaders, first 
Néstor Kirchner and later his widow, Cristina Fernández. 
Kirchnersim was part of a bigger story that contained it, 
that of Peronism, and it had a complicated relationship with 
traditional Peronist political and social machines. After los-
ing the presidency in 2015, its survival in the opposition 
will not be easy, and will depend on the strength of its par-
liamentary bench and on Fernández’s skills to reinvent her-
self. It is at best unclear whether some truly Kirchnerist po-
litical force could return to government in 2019.
The FA’s prospects are different. It may win or lose the 
2019 presidential election; if it wins, the FA cycle will go on. 
If it loses, the FA has a long history of being in opposition, it 
is culturally and institutionally as strong as Peronism, clear-
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ly stronger than Kirchnerism, and will wait for its likely re-
turn to government as one of the two political halves of the 
country.
Provisionally and pending further research, these stories 
may help to a better understanding of the regional turns to 
the left. Some of these left turns, of which Uruguay may be 
a good example, are deeply rooted in national pasts. In oth-
er countries those roots are not unequivocally anchored in 
the left, as in Argentina, where at the peak of their influ-
ence both “neoliberal” Menemism and left-wing Kirchner-
ism were seen as part of Peronism. In these cases, what we 
now see as turns to the left were “created from above,” af-
ter an opposition party or coalition which was not from the 
left won government. Short unsuccessful stories of this kind 
happened in Paraguay (with Fernando Lugo’s failed presi-
dency) and Honduras (Manuel Zelaya’s). Others so far suc-
cessful turns to the left may be seen as such “after the fact” 
as well. They show the building of left wing options from 
above, as in Venezuela. In Andean countries as Ecuador and 
perhaps Bolivia, the essence of those turns is rooted not so 
much in a deliberately ideological option for the left as in 
the coupling of growing dissatisfactions and deep inequali-
ties associated with ethno-cultural identities. True left wing 
parties and coalitions may be in the process of being built 
from above “after the fact,” because in some of those coun-
tries there was no previous mass-based political left.
Whether “from above” or not, regional turns to the left 
have common starting points in people’s dissatisfactions with 
their respective status quo. According to Queirolo’s macro- 
and micro-level analyses of the determinants of the vote 
for left-oriented parties, electorates “are voting left simply 
because they want to try new alternatives that might im-
prove their economic well-being. […] the electoral possi-
bilities of success that leftist parties have by capitalizing on 
social discontent depend on the number of ‘untainted op-
position’ parties available in the political system” (Queirolo, 
2013, pp. 150-151). This explains why in Brazil and Uruguay 
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(where strong untainted left wing parties already existed) 
there was a real turn to the left, whereas in Mexico the PRI 
was finally defeated by the center-right PAN: there was no 
Mexican turn to the left.25 Seen from this perspective, the 
cases in which the left was built mostly from above are a 
different, alternative path. As in Mexico, at first there were 
no strong left wing parties available as ‘untainted opposi-
tion,’ but as in Argentina, a governing left was built from 
above.
Whether contemporary Latin American turns to the left 
were led by previously existing left wing parties or were 
built from governments, their prospects depend on their ca-
pacity to satisfy their people´s  expectations. If they fail, the 
turns themselves will fail, at least in truly competitive poli-
ties. Nevertheless, the nature of the left turns’ political ori-
gins makes a difference. Where the governing left parties 
were already established before the turns (as in Uruguay), 
this makes them more resilient because party identities are 
stronger, and this resilience improves their medium and 
long term prospects. Conversely, newer, “after the fact” left 
wing parties and coalitions (as in Argentina) are weaker, 
which debilitates their prospects.
Latin American turns to the left will probably not follow 
the same path in the future. It is unlikely that all or most of 
the countries involved will experience an opposite turn, or 
that most of them will continue their present left cycle. The 
futures of the turns to the left will probably diverge because 
their central causal factor is to meet peoples’ expectations, 
which are already going different paths in different coun-
tries. The political forms of those divergences will be con-
ditioned by their political cultures and histories and by his-
torical accidents such as the nature of political leaderships.
25 The Mexican left wing needed a few extra years for coming close to winning 
government with López Obrador as its presidential candidate.
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